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Atkins v. Virginia
122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)
L Faas
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins ("Atkins") and William Jones
(Jones"), armed with a semiautomatic handgun, abducted Eric Nesbitt
("Nesbitt") from the parking lot of a convenience store.' While taking money
from Nesbitt's wallet, Atkins found Nesbitt's ATM card and instructed Jones to
drive to a nearby bank Bank security cameras recorded Nesbitt leaning across2
Jones to operate the ATM machine while Atkins pointed the gun at Nesbitt
After Nesbitt withdrew $200, Jones drove Atkins and Nesbitt to an isolated
location. Atkins and Nesbitt stepped out of the truck and Atkins shot Nesbitt
eight times, killing Nesbitt?
Jones and Atkins both testified during Atkins's trial.4 Their testimonies
were generally consistent with the exception that each claimed that the other
actually shot and killed Nesbitt.5 A jury convicted Atkins of the abduction,
robbery, and capital murder of Nesbitt.6 It also found him guilty of the use of
a firearm during these offenses.7
At the sentencing hearing, Atkins presented the testimony of a forensic
psychologist who stated that Atkins fell "in the range of being mildly mentally
retarded."' On cross-examination, the psychologist stated that he believed
Atkins was competent to stand trial and that it appeared that Atkins could
appreciate the nature of his behavior.9 The jury found that Atkins constituted a
future danger to society and that the murder of Nesbitt was outrageously or
1. Atkins v.Virginia, 122 S.O. 2242, 2244 (2002).
2. Atkins v.Connmonwealh, 520 S.E.2d 445,449 (Va. 1999).
3. ld at450.
4. A tkin, 122 S.0. at 2244. The prosecution allowvd "Jones to plead guikyto first-degree
murder in exchange for his testimony against Alins." Idat2244n.1.
5. Id
6.

Id Se padyVA.CODEANN. S 181-31(4) (OIchieSupp. 2002) (defiming capital murder

as [t~he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of anyperson in the commission of a robbery

or attempted robberyp); VA. ODE ANN. S182-48 (lchie Supp. 2002) (setting forth the circurnstances under which abduction is a Class 2 felony); VA. ODE ANN. S 182-58 (Mlchie 1996) (setting

forth the punishment for robbery).
7.

Adeim, 122S. O.at2244. SemdiyVA.CODEANN.S 18.2-53.1 (Mchie 19%) (stating

that use or displayof afirearm during the commission of certain felonies 'shall constitute aseparate
and distinct felony').
8.

Adiv, 510 S.E.2d at 451.

9.

Id
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wantonly vile.' It fixed his sentence at death." Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the jury was given a misleading jury forim The
court set aside the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing
hearing. 3 On remand, a jury found the future dangerousness and vileness
aggravators present and sentenced Atkins to death.14 Upon appeal, Atkins argued
that he could not be sentenced to death because of his mental retardation.
Relying on Peniy v Lynwb ("PeyI"),"6 the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected
Atkins's claim.17
I. Hddig
The United States Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment."
III. A mlsis
Atkins argued that his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because of his mental retardation.19 The
United States Supreme Court first considered the judgment of the state legislatures as to whether the death penalty is a suitable punishment for the mentally
retarded.2" The2Court then addressed whether it agreed with the consensus of
the legislatures. '
When the federal government reinstated the federal death penalty in 1988,
it provided that the mentally retarded were not eligible to receive the death
penaltyY' The next year, in PeiyI, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that even though fourteen states did not have the death penalty and two states
that had the death penalty had expressly banned the imposition of a death
10. Id Seew/IyVA. ODE ANN. S 192-2641 (Mlchie 2000) (stating that a defendant may
only receive a death sentence if a jury finds an aggravating factor and recommends that a death
sentence be imposed).
11. A ki, 510 S.E.2d at 453.
12. Id at 457.
13.
Id
14. Atkims, 122 S.C. at 2246.
15. Id

16.
17.

492 US. 302 (1989).
A tkim, 122 S. CL at 2246. Se gmwdy Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 305 (1989)

(conduding that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the execution of the mentallyretarded
simply by virtue of their mental retardation alone).
18. A tkin, 122 S.CQ. at 2252.
19. Id at 2246.
20. Id at 2248-50.
21. Id at 2248.
22. Id
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sentence on a mentallyretarded individual, a national consensus against executing
the mentally retarded had not been reached." Since then, twenty-one states have
passed laws prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.24 The Court
considered this legislative trend to be evidence that society views the mentally
retarded as "categoricallyless culpable than the average criminal" and concluded
that a national consensus has developed against the practice.2"
The Court discussed two reasons for agreeing with the national consensus
against the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded.26 First, the
Court considered two common justifications for the imposition of the death
2
penalty, retribution and deterrenceY.
As to retribution, the Court stated that "the
severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of
the offender."" The Court understood the legislative trend against imposition
of the death penaltyto mean that society finds the mentally retarded less culpable.2 Since the Court decided GtW v GQ * 3 it has narrowed the category of
crimes to which the death penalty may be applied and has consistentlysought to
apply the death penalty only to those who most deserve the sentence. 1 The
Court concluded that imposition of the death penalty on a group that is considered categorically less culpable is not appropriate. 2
The Court stated that the theory of deterrence is based upon the idea that
the severity of the death penalty would inhibit criminals from committing
murderous crimes." The Court found that a mentally retarded individual's
"diminished abilityto understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses" makes it less likely
that she will conform her conduct to avoid the possibility of execution.' Due
to these limitations on the ability of a person with mental retardation to reason
and control herself, the death penalty would have no deterrent effect on her
actions. In addition, prohibiting the execution of individuals with mental

23. Id(citing Paz% 492 US. at 334).
24. Atkin, 122 S. C. at 2248-49. Similar legislation passed through one house of the
legislature inadditional states, including Virginia. Id
25. Id at 2249.

26.

Id at 2251.

27.
28.
29.

Id
Id
Id at 2249.

30.

428 US. 153 (1976).

31. Atkin, 122 S.CL at 2251; seeGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that
the death penalty does not "invariably violate the Constitution").
32. Atkin, 122 S. CL at 2251.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id
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retardation will not lessen the death penalty's deterrent effect on other offenders
because they still will face the possibility of execution.' The Court also ageed with the national consensus of legislatures on the
ground that the mentally retarded face an increased risk of being sentenced to
death despite factors that call for a lesser punishment. 7 The mentally retarded
face a greater risk of false or coerced confessions, a lesser ability to put on an
effective presentation of mitigating evidence, and a diminished abilityto provide
meaningful assistance to counseL38 In manycases the mentallyretarded are poor
witnesses and appear to the jury to feel no remorse for their crimes. 9 Categorically, the mentay retarded face significant risks of wrongly being executed and
the Court concluded that this risk justified exempting them from the death
penalty.€ In conclusion, the Court considered the Eighth Amendment in
context of society's "evolving standards of decency" and held that the execution
of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 1
IV. Applica

m
in

b~

A Virginia capital defense attomeywho suspects that his client is mentally
retarded has an obligation to take certain steps to protect his client from a
possible death sentence. First, counsel should make a motion for a mental health
42 If the defense expert finds the defendant to be
expert under Ake v CO~r
mentally retarded, then defense counsel has the option of taking this determination to the prosecution. In light of the expert's determination that the defendant
is mentally retarded, the prosecution may agree to forego the formal determination of mental retardation and seek a maximum sentence of life in prison.
If the prosecution does not agree to life, either byplea or bywaiving death,
counsel should then file a Motion to Strike Death. At the hearing on this motion, the court may find that the prosecution failed to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant was not retarded.43
A successful Motion to Strike Death leaves the defendant ineligible for the death
penalty, and the trial would proceed with life in prison as the maximum available
sentence. An unsuccessful Motion to Strike Death leaves the defendant eligible
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id
Id
A tim, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
Id

40.

Id

41. Id;swTrop v. Dufles, 356 US. 86,101 (1958) (stating that "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decencythat markthe progress of amaturing
society").
42. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68,83 (1985) (holding that the state must provide a defendant
with a competent psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of his defense).
43. See u text accompanying notes 71-74.
44. SeeA tks, 122 S. .. at 2252.
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for the death penalty. However, the issue of the defendant's mental retardation
may still play a critical role in the defendant's trial and sentencing.
General evidence of a defendant's mental retardation may enter a trial in
several ways. First, the Court in A iiv noted that the mentally retarded have a
greater likelihood of giving forced or coerced confessions. 4 If the defendant has
given a confession, evidence of his mental retardation may be used to create
doubt as to the reliability of the confession.4 Second, the Court observed that
mentally retarded individuals have a reduced ability to understand and process
information, engage in logical reasoning, and control impulses. Although
Virginia does not formally recognize a diminished capacity defense, 8 mental
retardation evidence might cast doubt on whether the defendant premeditated
the killing. 4' Psychological evidence is admissible in Virg insofar as it bears on
the presence or absence of the requisite mental state.' Throughout the guilt
phase of the trial, defense counsel should be mindful that mental retardation will
reappear in the sentencing phase."'
In addition to these basic considerations, defense counsel should keep in
mind that there are other sources for definitions of mental retardation. In
A Akim, the Court noted the definition found in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition ("DSM IV").2 It also noted the
similar definition provided bythe American Association of Mental Retardation. 3
45.

Id at 2251-52.

46.

Sw,8 , KathrynRoe Eldridge, Case Note, 14 CAP.DEF.J.411 (2002) (analyzingPritchett

v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E2d 205 (Va. 2002)).
47. A &i, 122 S. CL at 2252.

48. SeeStamper v. Commonweah, 324 S.E2d 682,688 (Va. 1985) (holding that diminished
capackyevidence isnot admissible in Virginia); Smith v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871, 879-80
(Va. 1990) (applying the reasoning of Swqw to a death penalty case).
49. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Nfichie Supp. 2002) (incuding premeditation in the
definition of capital murder).
50. SeegunUy Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 801 (Va. C. App. 1989) (admitting
psychological evidence relevant to premeditation).
51. $ ifr text accompanying notes 75-77.
52. A tz, 122 S. CO at 2245.
"The essential feature of Mental Retardation is s"g.i.cantlysubaverge general intellectual functionig Grierion that isaccompa
bysignifcant lmtatons in adaptive
fictoninat eas
o the following skill areas: commnication, self-care, Home
socialinterpersonalslkills, use of communityresources self-direction, functional
.ac mic skills, work leisure, health and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur
before age 18 years (Caterion q."
Id (quoting AM. PSYGCIATr1C ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994)).
53. Id
The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation
as follows: "Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning.
It is characterized bysignificantlysubaverage intellectUal functioning, existig concurreny with related limitaions in two or more of the following applicable aaptive skill
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State statues also provide definitions of mental retardation. Section 37.1-1 of the
Virginia Code defines mental retardation as "substantial subaverage general
intellectual functioning which originates during the development period and is
associated with
airment in adaptive behavior." 4 Section 15A-2005 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina prohibits the imposition of a death sentence
on a mentally retarded individual.' This statute includes in its definition of
mental retardation a significantly subaverage intellectual functioning that manifested itself before eighteen and an IQ of seventy or below.16 Counsel may
attempt to utilize the definition that best describes his client.
V. Issues Lt Unrnsdu.ly Atins
The Court acknowledged that despite the national consensus against the
execution of the mentally retarded, disagreement may arise over what constitutes
mental retardation. 7 In Foni vu Waiw ss the Court stated that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane. 9 The Court then left to the
states the determination of how to enforce this constitutional restriction. 60
Similarly, in A tki, the Court gave the states the responsibility of implementing
the Eighth Amendment's restriction on the execution of the mentallyretarded.6'
The Court did not give the states significant guidance as to how to meet the
Eighth Amendment's restriction.62 While the precise IQ level or definition of
mental retardation may not be clear, a defendant may use the general standards

areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work Mental retardation
manifests before age 18."
Id (quoting AM. ASS'N OF MENrAL RETARDATION, MENrAL RETARDATION: DEFINMTON,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEhMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (emphasis in original omitted) (9th ed. 1992).
54. See VA.CODE ANN. S 37.1-1 (Mchie Supp. 2002) (defining mental retardation).
55. See N.C GEN. STAT. ANN. S 15A-2005 (2001).
56. Se id All statutes that barred the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded are pre-A &iw and are therefore never to be understood to substantively or procedurally
meet the constitutional standard of A tkim.
57. Aderu, 122S. C. at 2250.
58.
477 US. 399 (1986).
59. A kisz, 122 S. . at 2250; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US. 399,410,416-17 (1986) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on execution of the insane required states to impose
adequate procedures for insanity determinations).
60. Fo*n 477 US. at 416-17.
61. A tkim, 122 S. C at 2250.
62. Id In Fon4 the Court instructed the states that when implementing a procedure for
determining insanity, the lodestar must be "the overriding dual imperative of providing redress for
those with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the factfinding determination. . . It
is all the more important that the adversarypresentation of relevant information be as unrestricted

as possible." Fom 477 US. at 417.
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suggested byFodto argue that certain rights must be afforded a defendant who
claims mental retardation."
Not only does A tis not address the constitutional definition of mental
retardation, neither does it address procedurally how the A tkis rule is to be
applied.'" The determination of mental retardation maybe made pretrial, at the
conclusion of the guilt phase, at a special mental retardation determination
proceeding, or at the sentencing hearing. First, the determination of mental
retardation may be made prior to trial at a special proceeding. Second, the jury
could be given a special verdict form at the conclusion of the guilt phase. Third,
the trial could be trifurcated into the guilt phase, a mental retardation determination proceeding, and then, if no mental retardation was found, the sentencing
proceeding. Finally, mental retardation could be considered a gateway factor at
the sentencing hearing. The prosecution would be forced to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentallyretarded in order to proceed
with the sentencing hearing. In A tkr, the Court observed that a mentally
retarded defendant has a reduced abilityto assist counsel and present mitigating
evidence, thus the defendant should not be put through the sentencing hearing
unless no mental retardation has been found. 5
A tki serves as a constitutional limitation on the imposition of the death
penalty.6 s In Ticn v A zmi and Em i v F/oi 68 the Court set forth the
minimum Eighth Amendment mens rea and actus reus that a defendant must
have exhibited during the commission of a crime in order to be sentenced to
death.69 In the federal death penaltysystem, the Ermnorand Tcn factors act as
a gatewaythat the Government must pass in order to reach juryconsideration of
the death sentence.' AnalyticallyA tkvi is identical to Ermaaiand Tan. A jury
must find an absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to consider the death penalty.

63. See A tkin, 122 S. Ca at 2250; Fonr4 477 U.S. at 417 (advising the states to implement
procedures that allow for adversary presentation of evidence and selection of experts who will
present neutral evidence as to a defendant's mental competence).
64.

SeA tkim, 122 S. C. at 2244-52.

65.

Seid at 2252.

66.

Id

67.

481 US. 137 (1987).

68.

458 US. 782 (1982).

69.

See Tison v. Arizona, 481 US. 137, 156-58 (1987) (holding that if the individualized

inquiry into defendant's culpability reveals major participation in the felony and a reckless indifference to human life, the culpability requirement of E rmrois sufficient to warrant imposition of the
death penalt); Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a sentence of death was

excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an accomplice to murder).

70. See 18 U.S.C 5 3591(a) (2002) (requiring the defendant to have acted intentionally in
order to be death eligible); 21 U.S.C S 848(n) (2002) (listing the aggravating factors that make a
defendant death eligible).

124
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Prior to A tkim, there were no gateway factors in Virginia because Sections
18.2-18 and 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code subsume the EnurTscnissue.71
A tkir creates the Commonwealth's first gateway factor. After A im, the
absence of mental retardation is an element under Ring v A oizrna72 Thus, the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant is not mentally retarded before
the jury can consider death.
The Court in A 1im did not address whether the defendant bears the
burden of proving mental retardation or the prosecution bears the burden of
roving no mental retardation." In addition, the Court did not address what
urden applies. In both Virginia and the federal system, the government bears
the burden of proving the EnmorJ 7sn factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
The defendant does not bear the burden of proving that he did not have the
necessary mens rea or actus reus.7s If the absence of mental retardation acts as
a threshold that must be met before the jurycan consider death, analogous to the
EnmmJd-T on threshold, then the Commonwealth would have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentally retarded.
If the Commonwealth has the burden of proof at this point in the proceeding,
then logically it should also have the burden of proof at a mental retardation
determination that occurs prior to trial.76
The State's burden to prove non-mental retardation beyond a reasonable
doubt, assuming it is successfully met, does not end the mental retardation
analysis. Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia Code specifically makes mental
retardation a mitigator.' It is perfectly possible for the jury to find no mental
retardation, thus passing the gateway, hear evidence in aggravation, hear general
evidence of the defendant's mental retardation, and find mental retardation to be
a mitigator. For example, assume that the mental retardation IQ level is set at
seventy for A tkim purposes. Defendant scores a seventy-two, but has other
mental retardation attributes, such as deficient life skills and/or onset before age
eighteen. A jurycan find that this level of low intellectual functioning is a reason
to sentence the defendant to life rather than death. The definition of mental

71.
72.

See VA. CODE ANN. SS18.2-18,18.2-31 (hvichie Supp. 2002).
SwRing v. Arizona, 122 S. C. 2428,2443 (2002) (holding that any"factor" which makes

the defendant death eligible functions as an element of the offense and the Sixth Amendment
demands that it be found by a jury-.
73. SeA A, 122 S. Ct. at 2252. The Court did not address whether the jury must unanim
mously find mental retardation. 1d; seRig 122 S. O. at 2428.
74. See 18 US.C S 3591(a); 21 U.S.CS 848(n); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-18,182-31.
75. C. Mullaney v. Wibur, 421 Us. 684, 702 (1975) (acknowledging that the prosecution
cannot shift to the defendant the burden of proving the absence of an element of a crime).
76. Seesup text accompanying note 43.
77. SeeV. CODE ANN. S192-264.4(B) (2000) (stating that "mitigation.. .may include..
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of lawP).
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retardation need not be the same forA tkis and section 19.2-264.4(B) purposes.'8
In A kin, mental retardation acts as a bar to death.' In mitigation, mental
retardation is a reason to show mercy.
VI. cbfwicn

The United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded.s' The Court did not set forth any
standards or procedures for states to use in implemen
this prohibition. The
states that had already legislated against the execution of the mentally retarded
must now reassess their procedures to ensure that the Eighth Amendment rights
of the mentally retarded are adequately protected. Those states, including
Virginia, that had not legislated against the imposition of the death penaltyon the
mentally retarded must now implement procedures in compliance with A dis.
Kristen F. Grunewald

78. See id; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US. 104, 113-17 (1982) (finding that a defendant
should be permitted to present micgating evidence of a violent familyhistory); Lockect v. Ohio, 438
US. 586,607(1978) (stating that adefendant should not be prevented from presenting
evidence of his record or cacter to the jury. Lcdk~r andEdir~h' lyfoAoidtheuseofAten
to bar mental retardation as a mitigator. Teysand for the proposition that the state cannot forbid
the admission of, and must instruct the juy to consider, evidence that may convince asingle juror
to spare the defendant's life. Edq, 455 US. at 113-17; LoAA, 438 US. at 607.
79. Adems, 122 S.CL at 2252.
80. I

